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182 Cou~TY OF Pr,ACER v. AET~A CAs. ETC. Co. [50 C.2d 
~ o. 6S!J4. In Bank. Apr. 8, 
THE COUNTY OF PLACER, Re>spondent, v. AETNA 
CASUAI/l'Y AND SEHE'l'Y CO::\IPANY et al., Ap-
pellants. 
[1] Suretyship-Contract-Law as Entering Into Contract.-The 
terms of a statute dealing "·ith oiTteial bonds the obliga-
tion of the surety within the penal sum specified are read into 
the bond and become a part of it. 
[2] Public Officers- Deputies and Subordinates- Liability of 
PrincipaL---A public offleer is not responsible for the acts or 
omissions of subordinates properly employed hy or under him, 
if such subordinates aTe not in his private service but are 
themselves servants of the government, unless he has directed 
such acts to be clone or has personally cooperatpd therein. 
[3] !d.-Deputies and Subordinates--Liability of PrincipaL-A 
judicial district judge cannot be held liable for the embezzle-
ment of his clerk where he neither directed, participated in 
nor countenanced the clerk's embezzlement of the moneys en-
trusted to her. 
[ 4] Statutes-Construction.-Statutes relating to the same subject 
matter arc to be construed together and harmonized if pos-
sible. 
[5] Public Officers- Deputies and Subordinates- Liability of 
Principal.-Gov. Code, § 1504, imposes absolute liability for 
"any and all breaches" of the conditions of the official bond 
executed by any principal officer, his deputy or clerk, whereas 
Gov. Code, § 1953.:-i, imposes liability for "moneys stolen" 
from a judicial district officer's offici11l custody only when the 
public officer fails to exercise due care. 
[6] Larceny-Effect of Statute Defining Theft.-In view of Pen. 
Code, §§ 484, -190a, relating to theft, the term "moneys stolen" 
in Gov. Code, § 19iiB.5, includes the crime of embezzlement 
though the elem0nts of the crime itscif remain unchanged. 
[7] Statutes-Construction-General and Particular Provisions.-
·where the terms of a later specific statute apply to a situution 
cov0red by an earlier general one, the later speciflc statute 
controls. 
[2] Liability of public officer or his bond for the defaults and 
misfeusances of his clerks, assistants or deputies, notes, 1 A.L.R. 
:22:?.; 12 A.L.R. OSO; 10:?. A.L.R. 174; 116 A.L.R. lOG-!. See also 
Cal.Jur.2d, Puhli'o Offleers, § 2:24; Am.Jur., Public Officers, § 467. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Suretyship,§ 16; [2, 3, 5, 8] Public 
Ofiiccrs, § 175; [4] Statutes, § 164(1); [6] Lareeny, § 3; [7] Stat-
utes, §164(3). 
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[8] Public Officers--Deputies and Subordinatil3--Liability of Prin-
cipaL--In an aetion by a county agninst a jurlicinl dic;triet 
judge and his suret.iPs, which was based on the clerk's alleged 
embezzlement of eounty funds, the court <:nPd in din:cting a 
verdict for tile county :J]l(1 thus frolll the r:1se the 
issue of whether or not the ;judge excrl'ised due care, where 
Gov. § 1%3.5, rather than § 1;304, wns npplicable. 
APPEAl~ from a judgment of the Surwrior Court of Placer 
County. James Snell, Judge.* Ileverscd with directions. 
Action ]Jy county against judieial distriet judge, his sureties 
and his clerk, l.ms~'d on clerk's alleg-rcl embezzlement of eounty 
funds. Judgment agaiust sureties and judge on directed ver-
dict for plaiuiifr, rcvcn;ed with directions. 
Hobinson & Hobinson and D. H. Robinson for Appellants. 
AI. B. Broyer, District Attorm'y, for Respondent. 
CAR'rEn, J.--This is an appral by defendants, Aetna 
Casualty and Surety Company, United Paeifie Insurance Com-
pany, and Leonard JH. IJaytou, from a judgment eutered upon 
a verdict by a jury. 'I'he verdict was directed by the court 
in favor of the plaintiff. 
The fads are not in dic;pute. Defendant Shf'rlie Br'nnett 
(who defaulted) was the derk of the Hoseville Judicial Dis-
trict Court in Placer County and had been appointed to that 
position by defendant lJeonard 1\IL Layton, judge of said court. 
On January 1, 1D;)2, the Ilosrville ,Jnstiee's Court was ronsoli-
dated with the Hoseville City Court wherrhy the Roseville 
,T udicial District Court came into being. J urlge Layton had 
been judge o:: the Hoseville Justice's Court for many yNlrs 
prior to the eonsolidation and thereafter became judge of 
the Hoseville Judicial District Court. After the consolidation 
the Placer County Board of Supervisors authorized the em-
ployment of a clerk and Sherlie Bennett was hirrd to fill the 
position at that time. Shr served until her arrest in 1'\ovr>m-
ber, 1D54. In 1D51, defendant Artna Casualty and Surdy 
Company bonded Judge Layton, as prineipal, with itself as 
surety, in the sum of $1,000 for ,Judge Layton's four year 
term which began on ,Jannary 8, 1951. Defendant United 
Pacific executed a 8imilar ::;urctyship bond in the sum of $5,000 
for Judge Layton's term which began on ,Jan nary 5, 1953. 
*Assigned by Chairman of .Judicial Council. 
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Both of thrsc bonds were rxer•utr>d by ,Judge Layton. The 
eounty of Plal'<'r JlllrehasPd a blankrt. employees' bond which 
heeame pffcetive on Pehruary 1, 19:J4, and whic.h covered 
Sher]ie Dennett. The total amount of money stolen by Sherlir 
BclJJiett was set at $11,807.75, of whic.h the blanket employees' 
how! paid off aJl lint $4,548.50 and the prayrr or tJw I'Olllp]aint 
was :tli!Pllltl'd to t·Uitl'onn to that fi;2·nn•. 
On .July 1, 1953, the c.ount.y's auditors found a shortage of 
$l,fi47.2i'i whid1 was 1·allrd to the attention of the Placer 
County anditor who eallrd it to the attention of the chairman 
of thc board of supervisors who was also the supervisor from 
t ht• Hoseville District. The shortage was formally called to 
the attention of the board of supervisors on November 16, 
1058. Sherlie Bennett had been allowed to make up the 
shortage and the formal written audit filed on November 16, 
1 !1:5:3, ('arried a uotation that the deficit had been substantially 
made up. 
WhPn thP connty's auditors began thrir fiscal year audit in 
,J ul.v, 19fl4, morP shortagps in the Hose ville Court were dis-
<'OVPrrd and a spe(•ial audit was requestPd of the board of 
supervisors. 'fhe speeial audit, as herrtoforc noted, disclosed 
a total defieieney of $11,807.7 5. 
'l'he ehairman of the board of supervisors testified that he 
Ntlled ,Judge Layton';;; attention to the $1,647.25 shortage indi-
(~ated in the andit report of Novembrr 16, 1953. Judge Layton 
teNtified that he knew nothing about the $1.647.25 shortage 
until the day after Sherlir Bennett was arrested. The record 
shows that during the time of the 195:3 audit ,Judge Layton. 
a man 70 year:-; of age, was seriously ill in the hospital and 
did not sit ou the beneh during September and October while 
he was reeuprrating from hiR illness. 
'l'he reeord shows that Sherlie Brunett used many different 
methods in embPzzling tlJe funds turned over to hPr in her 
offieial capacity as clrrk of the court. As Pxamples, she would 
alter the official receipts by changing one from $250 to $2.50; 
she would void receipts or issue no receipts at all; she also 
obtained for her per>Jonal use official receipt books which shr 
kept in her OWl! possession and which were nev(•r turnrd in 
to the proper authorities. Other methods used by her are too 
detailed to repeat here and it is unnecessary to do so since 
the conc:lusion is inesc·.apable that she was guilty of the crime 
of embezzlement. 
The primary question involved here is whether Judge Lay-
ton is absolutely liable under section 1504 of the Government 
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CodP, or whP1hPr h:• i.~ liab;r' only if negligPnt as provided 
for in section 1953.5 of the same code. 
Section 1504, whi<·h Wll~ rwwted in 1872 (Pol. Codr, §S 959 
and 960) and as it read prior to the 1955 amendment, pro-
vides: ''Every official bond executed by any officer pursu11nt 
to Jaw is in forer and obligatory upon the principal and sure-
ties therein foT: 
"(a) Any and all breaches of the conditions thereof com-
mitted during the time ;,m·h officer continues to discharge any 
of the duties of or hold the office, and whether such breaches 
are <~ommittrd or suffered by the prim•ipal offieer, his deputy 
or elerk. 
" (b) 'l'he fait !Jfnl discharge of all duties which may be 
required of such offic·er b.'- any law enactrd :<nhsrqnelltly to 
the execution of the hond." 
Section 1953.5 whieh was euactrd in 1949, and amended 
in 1951, providrs: "No offieer of the State, or of any distriet, 
eonnty, city and eounty, city, or judieial distrid, is liable for 
mm1eys stolen from hi!'l oftieial cnsto(l.r unless the loss was 
snstainPd bet·;mse tlw offi<·er failrct to exPreise dne carr." 
It is drfendants' position that the 1927 amendments to 
Prmll Code, Sh·1 !ons 4R4 <Pid 400a. hrongllt ('Ill hrzzkn1nllt anrl 
lareeny within the word "thrft"; that the word "stolen" 
inrludes embezzl0ment. S('dion 400a of the Prnal Code, as 
added in 1927, providrs: '' \Vhrrrver any law or statute of 
this state refers to or mentions larceny, embezzlement, or 
stealing, said law or statnte shall hereafter be read and intPr-
preted as if the word 'theft' were substituted therefor." It 
is plaintiff's position that the elements of the various crimes 
remain the same d0spite thr amendment (People v. Tullos, 
57 Cal.App.2d 238, 287 [184 P.2d 2801) and that section 
1958.5 of the Govermnrnt Code applies where larceny, and 
not embezzlement, is involved. Plaintiff also rrlies upon the 
ease of Union Bank & TTust Co. Y. I.os A11geTes. 11 Cal.2d 675 
181 P.2d 919], decided by this eonrt in 1038, where the eonnty 
l'lrrk was held absolute]~- lia hlP for the embezzlement of a 
deputy eounty clerk under thr bonds required by seetions 
958 and 959 of the Politic·al Code (Gov. Code, §§ 1500, 1503 
and 1504). Defendants argue that the ''harsh rule'' of the 
1Tnion Baul\ easr was ,.hallg-ed by the Legislatnre whrn, in 
El4!1, Govl'l'lltlH'Id Co!1<', Sl'<~tio11 l!lG:U'i was Pll:t<'tP(l. In thP 
FlliOII Bank (":J~('. th<· ("(lllrl 'Wid (p. G7~)): "' 11 mar hP ('011-
(•P(lrd that in the abseJH·e or statute the modern view is 
opposed to making pnblie offieers eivilly liable for torts of 
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where the latter are themselves statutory officers and 
not under the :mpcrior 's unrestrieted control or right of hiring 
and diseharging. (See Michel v. Smith, 188 Cal. 199 [205 
P. 113] [municipal police officer]; Yan Vorce v. Thomas, 18 
Cal.App.2d 723 [64 P.2d 772] [deputy marshal of muni(•ipal 
; Pavish v. Meyers, 120 \Vash. 605 [225 P. 633, 34 
A.hR 561] [police ; note, 43 Harv.Id\ev. 827.) The 
other view is usua.lly grounded npon the identity of the officer 
and his deputy or the unrestricted right of eontrol. (See 
Poley v. ltlartin, 142 Cal. 256 171 P. 165, 75 P. 842, 100 Am. 
St.Rep. 128]; Duluth v. Ross, 140 Minn. 161 [167 N.W. 485]; 
New York v. Pox, 282 N.Y. 167 [133 l\.E. 484].) In the 
instant case the clerk's dep1.dics are independent statutory 
ofjicM·s within the rule of S1tch cases as Michel v. Sm·ith, supra, 
and Yan Force v. Thomas, supra. But this docs not dispose 
of our problem. \Ve are satisfied that defendant Lampton 
and his sureties are not liable under common law principles 
of tort or agency. But lialn"lity may exist by reason of the 
language of the statute and the surety bond. (See Gmys 
Harbor Const. Co. v. Paulk. ]/0 Wash. 300 [i37 P.:.?(l 584]: 
Chicago v. Southern Surety Co., 230 Ill.App. 628, 640.) And 
upon an examination of the statute and the bond, it becomes 
clear that defendants arc liable under their terms .... ' " 
(Emphasis added.) Section 1504 of the Government Code 
provides for breaches eommitted "by the principal officer, 
his deputy or clerk." 'l'he bonds executed by Judge Layton 
make no mention of any deputy or clerk as did the bonds 
involved in the Union Bank case. ·while in the Union Bank 
case the court speeifically noted that the deputy who embezzled 
the funds was an independPnt statutory officer, the county 
clerk was held liable because of the language of the statute 
and the bond. The case is very like the one before us except 
for the terms of the bonds involYed and except that after 
the Union Bank case was decided the IJegislature enacted 
section 1953.5 of the Government Code. [1] Insofar as the 
failure of the bonds to indude elerks and deputies in the case 
at bar is concerned, the matter is covered by the case of 
Hartford Ace. etc. Co. v. City of Tulm·e, 30 Ca1.2d 832, 837 
[186 P.2d 121], where we said that "The terms of a statute 
dealing with official bonds fixing the obligation of the surety 
within the penal sum specified arc read into the bond and 
become a part of it." 
[2] The rnle stated in Michel v. Srnith, 188 Cal. 199, at 
pages 201, 202 [205 P. 118], is that "A public officer is not 
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JJV'-'""'-''"' for the acts or omissions of subordinates properly 
employed by or under him, if such subordinates are not in 
his private service, but are themselves servants of the govern-
ment, unless he has directed such acts to be done or has 
personally co-operated therein. (23 Am. & Eng. Ency. of 
Law, 382; Story on Agency, § 319; Robertson v. 127 
U.S. 507-515 [32 L.Ed. 203, 8 S.Ct. 1286, see also Rose's U.S. 
Notes]. See also note to 12 Ann. Cas. 184.) In opposition to 
this principle of law we are cited to those instances in which 
a sheriff has been held responsible for the acts of his deputies, 
but the respondent loses sight of the distinction between the 
two situations, which is recognized in the decisions. A sheriff 
is responsible for the acts of his deputies, for they are acting 
in his private service and in his name and stead, and are only 
public officers through him. 'fhe deputy is not the agent or 
servant of the sheriff but is his representative, and the sheriff 
is liable for his acts as if they had been done by himself. 
(Poley v. Martin, 142 CaL 256, 260 [100 Am:St.Rep. 123, 71 
P. 165, 7 5 P. 842].) A different rule prevails in the case of 
the chief of a municipal police department. He may even 
be charged with the duty of selecting the members of the force, 
but he is not responsible for their acts, unless he has directed 
such acts to be done, or has personally co-operated in the 
offense, for each policeman is, like himself, a public servant. 
(Casey v. Scott, 82 Ark. 362 [118 Am.St.Rep. 80, 12 Ann.Cas. • 
184, 101 S.W. 1152] .) The question was squarely presented 
and considered in this last case. An ordinance of the city of 
Texarkana provided for a dog tax and the manner of collect-
ing the same. It contained a provision that the chief of 
police of the city should employ a dog-catcher whose duty it 
should be to enforce the ordinance. The action was one 
brought against the chief of police, the dog-catcher appointed 
by him, and the city for the negligence of the dog-catcher. On 
an appeal by the chief of police from a verdict directed 
against him and the dog-catcher, the court said that in so far 
as the relation of the appellant to the action was concerned, 
the dog-catcher was a public servant selected by the chief of 
police, just as a patrolman would be selected by him or a 
mayor, or other appointing power, and held 'there is no lia-
bility in such case, unless the appointing officer fails to exer-
cise reasonable care in the selection of the appointee, a question 
not presented.' (See also a case somewhat in point, Baisley v. 
Henry, 55 Cal.App. 760 [204 P. 399] .) " The rule announced 
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in the Michel eas<', heretofore quot<'d. has !wen followed in 
Kangirser v. Zink, 1:14 Cal.App.2<1 fi;)!J, ;)()() [ 28fi P.2d 9501 ; 
8arajini v. City & Connty of 8uu Pruneisco, 143 Cal.App.2d 
570, 575 [800 P.2d 44] ; Reed v. Molony, :l8 Cal.App.2d 405, 
410 [101 P.2d 175]: People v. Standard AJ·c. Ins. Co., 42 Cal. 
App.2d 40!!, 411 [108 P.2d !12:3[. In thP JattPr <·a:;;e which 
was de<·ided in 1941 it wa:.; said thHt (p. 411): ''The modern 
view adopted in this state is that puhliv oflkers an~ not civilly 
liable for torts of deputies, wheu tlH· latter are themselves 
statutory officers or not under the suJwrior's nnrestrieted eon-
trol or right of hiring and discharging. (Michd v. 8mith, 188 
Cal. 199 [205 P. 11:3]; Van Vorce v. '1'/wmas, 18 Cal.App.2d 
723 [G4 P.2d 772]; Fnion Bank & 1'ntsf Co. Y. Los Angeles 
County, (Cal.) 74 P.2d 240.) [A rehearing was granted in 
the Union Bank & 'rrust Company case and the opinion 
modified and reported in 11 Cal.2d GIG (81 P.2d 919).]" 
[3] In the ease at bar the position of elPrk of the Roseville 
,Judicial District was ereated, and the employment of the clerk 
was authorized, by the Plaeer County Board of Supervisors. 
,Judge I,ayton testified that ''The offiee of Clerk was erPated 
and I was informed to that eft'el't lwfore the new eourt system 
went into effeet, 1 think, in De<~<'mher.'' \Vhen asked who 
filled the office and how it was done, he replied: ''I was 
informed by,-I don't remember whether it was by a letter 
from the Board of Supervisors or by one of the members of 
the Board personally, that I was allowed a Clerk, and just 
what wording was used 1 cannot remember but it was appar-
ently left to me to find somebody to fill that position." The 
chairman of the board of supervisors testified that ''The 
position wa>; ereated by the Board of Supervisors and under 
the rule that we used ill Placer County we ereated the position, 
set the salary and the department head hired his own help." 
Under the rules of the cases heretofore eited and discussed it 
appears that Sherlie Bennett vvas herself ''a servant of the 
government." In sueh an event, Judge Layton is not respon-
sible for her conduct unless he direeted it, partieipated there-
in, or, as one of the cases brought out, "countenaueed" it. 
'rhe record shows, without conflict, that J udgc I_.ayton cannot 
be hPld liable for the embezzlement of Sherlie Bennett under 
the rule stated in Michel v. 8rnith, 188 Cal. 199 [205 P. 113], 
and the subsequent cases following the same rule, since he 
neither directed, partieipated in, or countenanced the clerk's 
embezzlement of the moneys entrusted to his eustody. 
[ 4] It has long been the rule in this state that statutes 
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relating to the same subject matter are to be construed to-
gether and harmonized if possible (Estate of Wedemeyer, 109 
CaLApp.2d 67 [240 P.2d 8); In re Petraeus, 12 Cal.2d 579, 
582 (86 P.2d 343] ; People v. Trieber, 28 Cal.2d 657, 661 [171 
P.2d 1] ; Lucas v. City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal.2d 476, 483 
P.2d 599] ; Pierce v. Riley, 21 Cal.App.2d 513, 518 (70 
P.2d 206]). {5] Section 1504 imposes absolute liability 
for ''any and all breaches'' of the conditions of the official 
bond executed by any principal officer, his deputy or clerk; 
section 1953.5 imposes liability for "moneys stolf•n" from a 
judicial district officer's official custody only when the public 
officer fails to exercise due care. [6] Under the Penal Code 
statutes heretofore cited and quoted the term "moneys stolen" 
most certainly includes the crime of embezzlement even though 
the elements of the crime itself remain unchanged. 'Vhile 
section 1504 covers the situation here involved in a general 
way, section 1953.5 refers specifically to a "judicial district" 
and the liability of an officer for ''moneys stolen'' from his 
official custody. Section 1953.5 was added to the Government 
Code in 1949 (Stats. 1949, ch. 1598, p. 2845, § 1) and amended 
in 1951 (Stats. 1951, ch. 1553, p. 3537, § 15) by substituting 
the words "judicial district" for the word "township." 
[7] Where the terms of a later specific statute apply to a 
situation covered by an earlier general one, the later specific 
statute controls (People v. Haydon, 106 Cal.App.2d 105, 111 
[234 P.2d 720] ). As we held in Rose v. State, 19 CaL2d 713, 
723, 724 [ 123 P .2d 505] : ''It is well settled, also, that a 
general provision is controlled by one that is special, the 
latter being treated as an exception to the former. A specific 
provision relating to a particular subject will govern in respect 
to that subject, as against a general provision, although the 
latter, standing alone, would be broad enough to include the 
subject to which the more particular provision relates!' (See 
also People v. Moroney, 24 Cal.2d 638, 644 (150 P.2d 888] ; 
Coker v. Superior Court, 70 Cal.App.2d 199, 201 [160 P.2d 
885]; Whittemore v. Seydel, 74 Cal.App.2d 109, 120 [168 
P.2d 212].) 
Inasmuch as the Union Bank case, supra, 11 Cal.2d 675, 
was decided in 1938 and prior to the enactment in 1949 of 
section 1953.5 of the Government Code and its amendment in 
1951, and since this court there specifically held that absolute 
liability existed "because of the language of the statute" 
it is not controlling here. 
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[8] Defendants also eomplain that the trial court erred in 
directing a verdict and thus removiug from the ease the issue 
of whether or not ,Judge Ijayton exercised due care. This 
contention is meritorious because of our condusion that section 
1953.5 of the Government Code is controlling in the case at 
bar rather than section 1504 of the same code. 
'l'he is reversed with directions to the trial court 
to retry the case on the issue of the or lack thereof, 
of due <-are on the part of Judge Layton. 
Gibson, C. ,T., Shenk, ,J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
J',IeComb, J., concurred. 
SPENCE, J.-I dissent. For the reasons stated by the 
District Court of Appeal, 'rhird Appellate District, when this 
cause was decided by that court (County of Placer v. Aetna 
Cas11alty c(; Surely Co. (CaLApp.) :317 P.2d 639), I would 
affirm the judgment. 
[Crim. No. 6173. In Bank. Apr. 10, 1958.) 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. NATHAN HARRIS 
SNYDER,* Appellant. 
[1] Grand Jury-Organization-Time of Service and Discharge.-
Where the superior court ordered the 1955 grand jury to re-
main operative until March 5, 1956, and at the same time im-
paneled the 1956 grnnd jury but ordered that the oath should 
not be administered until the tenure of the 1955 grand jury 
1mded, and where, on March 21, 1956, the 1955 grand jury 
returned an indictment against defendant and was dismissed, 
and thereafter the 1956 grand jurors were administered the 
oath of office, the 1955 grand jury did not cease to he an 
official body at the time it returned the indictment. 
[2] Perjury-Evidence.-In a prosecution for perjury based on de-
fendant's testimony before two grand juries that the political 
club of which he was secretary made no contributions on be-
McK. Dig. References: [1] Grand Jury, § 19; [2, 3] Perjury, 
§ 20 (1); Witnesses, § 19. 
''Reporter's Xote: This case was previously entitled "People v. 
Bonelli." 
